The establishment of a Special Tribunal for Russia, the return of abducted Ukrainian children, the Compensation Mechanism and restoration are the main priorities of Ukrainians in the Council of Europe. We talked to Borys Tarasyuk about his activities as Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the Council of Europe and our plans for the rest of the year.
T.S.: The Ukrainian delegation to PACE and the Permanent Representation of Ukraine to the Council of Europe – how do you cooperate with each other? What is your personal mission as Permanent Representative?
B.T.: We work as a united team. The delegation of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine participates in the sessions of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE), and the Permanent Representation provides diplomatic and analytical support upon request. As the Permanent Representative appointed by the President, I am responsible for organizing and maintaining constant communication of Ukrainian institutions and organizations with all Council of Europe bodies, protecting our interests, promoting our initiatives, in particular, to punish Russia for its aggression. This includes political, legal, and informational work.
T.S.: What key stages in Ukraine’s activities in the context of countering Russian aggression in the Council of Europe can you highlight? What achievements are you proud of?
B.T.: After the start of Russia’s full-scale aggression in February 2022, Ukraine immediately initiated a large-scale diplomatic offensive in the Council of Europe. The key and unprecedented decision was the expulsion of the Russian Federation from the Council of Europe, which had not happened in the history of the organization since 1949. This became possible thanks to our active work with allies, consistent arguments and mobilization of the European community.
The second decisive stage was the creation of the Register of Damage, which was launched in 2023. It records all the damage caused by Russia, both to the state and to individuals. This is the first practical tool at the European level that paves the way for compensation to be paid to affected Ukrainians.
The next step is to develop a Special Tribunal to punish the crime of aggression against Ukraine. This is the most difficult but fundamental area. After all, it is through the crime of aggression that Russia committed all other crimes – murders, deportations, torture. We have already received political support, completed the development of the constituent documents, and are now working on launching the tribunal itself.
In addition, we were able to put the issue of supporting Ukraine on the permanent agenda of all Council of Europe bodies – the Committee of Ministers, PACE, Congress of Local and Regional Authorities, Venice Commission, and the Office of the Secretary General. Ukraine is not “one of the topics” but a central priority in the Council of Europe’s policy.
It is also important that our parliamentarians have achieved the recognition of Russia as an aggressor state and a state that finances terrorism in the texts of resolutions. This legally and politically underpins future international legal proceedings and reparations mechanisms.
I am personally proud that our team has consistently and effectively transformed the Council of Europe from a platform of general declarations into a platform of concrete decisions in favor of Ukraine. This is the result of daily diplomatic work – on the sidelines, at round tables, during meetings and negotiations. And this is just the beginning.
T.S.: How will we change the Council of Europe after 2022?
B.T.: The Council of Europe, which had previously tried to avoid “uncomfortable topics,” is now clearly calling a spade a spade: Russia is the aggressor, Ukraine is the victim. After 2022, the organization stopped tolerating gross human rights violations under the guise of diplomacy. We have made the topic of justice, accountability and compensation central at the European level.
T.S.: One of the main activities of our delegation to PACE is the creation of a Special Tribunal for Russia. You said that this requires Alain Berset to sign a bilateral agreement with Ukraine. The media predicted the creation of the tribunal back in May, but this did not happen. Why? What is the most realistic deadline for this process?
B.T.: The expectations for May were optimistic. But on 25 June 2025, President Zelenskyy and CoE’s Secretary‑General Berset formally signed the agreement and annexed Statute in Strasbourg. With the agreement now in place, the Council of Europe is preparing an Enlarged Partial Agreement to invite states and the EU to join. Once it’s ratified and funding is confirmed, judicial appointments and administrative structures can begin. All parties expect the tribunal to be operational in 2026, with proceedings starting once key officials leave office or immunity is lifted
T.S.: Do all Council of Europe members unanimously support the creation of a Special Tribunal for Russia? In particular, as Alain Berset said: “Justice also needs resources…”, is the issue of financing the tribunal a cornerstone in the Council of Europe?
B.T.: The overwhelming majority supports it, but there is a small group of countries that do not support the idea of bringing Russia to justice at all. However, we currently have enough support for our initiatives.
The exact cost is still being calculated, but according to preliminary estimates, it will be comparable to the costs of other international or international specialized criminal tribunals. We are talking about tens of millions of euros – much less than in the case of large UN tribunals, but enough for a full-fledged launch and operation.
For reference:
- The Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL): costs for 10 years exceeded 600 million euros (it was too expensive and non-transparent – exactly the kind of example Ukraine wants to avoid).
- The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR): more than $1.5 billion over the entire period of operation.
- The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY): over $2 billion.
We insist on an efficient and optimal model, without excessive bureaucratic burden. Within the Council of Europe, there is a mechanism of “enhanced partial agreement” that will allow for flexible voluntary funding from interested countries – both Council of Europe members and non-member states such as Canada, the United States or Japan.
So, funding is not the main obstacle. It is rather a matter of political will and agreeing on a scale of contributions. And we see that the support from our partners is real and gradual.
T.S.: There used to be a lot of debate about the format of the tribunal, how it will work and its location – is there already a unified vision of the tribunal’s work among the delegates?
B.T.: Yes, over the past year, the negotiating team has made significant progress in resolving the most difficult issue – the format of the future Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression against Ukraine. Previously, there were different approaches: some countries advocated the creation of a tribunal based on existing international institutions, such as the International Criminal Court (ICC). But we have made it clear that the ICC has no jurisdiction over the crime of aggression unless both parties to the conflict have ratified the Rome Statute, and Russia has not done so.
Thanks to the active work of the Core Group of States (which includes Ukraine and many Council of Europe member states), a consolidated vision has been established: The Tribunal will be established as a separate international institution based on an agreement between Ukraine and the Council of Europe, open to other countries. This will ensure independence, legitimacy and flexibility in the future work of the institution.
There was also broad agreement on the location: the tribunal’s headquarters will most likely be in The Hague, along with other international courts. This is a logical and practical solution, given the infrastructure, experience, and symbolic weight of The Hague as the “world capital of international justice.”
T.S.: On May 13-14, the Committee of Ministers met in Luxembourg. What key decisions/events were significant for Ukraine at this meeting? What comments were made by countries that do not support the tribunal and the Compensation Mechanism for Ukraine?
B.T.: It was an important event. During the session, Ukraine officially handed over a package of documents to the Secretary General of the Council of Europe to launch the Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression – a draft agreement with the Council of Europe, the Tribunal’s Statute and a financial model. Secretary General Berset called it a historic step and called on member states to support the initiative politically and financially.
In addition, the Committee of Ministers reaffirmed its commitment to Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, and supported the continuation of work on accountability mechanisms, including the full launch of the Register of Damage and preparations for the establishment of a compensation commission.
The implementation of the Council of Europe’s Action Plan for Ukraine was also positively assessed, with special attention paid to the return of deported Ukrainian children.
T.S.: Ukraine is creating a compensation mechanism. Could you tell us what kind of funds will be used to compensate Ukrainians – frozen Russian assets or do we still hope to receive reparations from the enemy? What do you see as the ideal scenario for this mechanism and what are the risks on the way to its implementation?
B.T.: We believe that the main source should be frozen Russian assets in the EU, the US, Canada and other countries. They should be transferred to compensate Ukrainians, and this is a matter of justice. Reparations from Russia are unlikely in the short term. Risks include the political will of Western countries, legal difficulties and a long process. But we are already creating institutions that will allow us to start paying as soon as the resources are available.
T.S.: What areas of work of our Mission to the Council of Europe will be developed in 2025-26 (except for the Special Tribunal)?
B.T.: We are working in a comprehensive manner. Our priority is to launch the Compensation Commission, which will be the next step after the Register of Damage. This is critical for the start of real payments to Ukrainians who have lost their homes, businesses or relatives.
A separate area is the return of deported Ukrainian children. We support the work of the International Coalition and the Special Envoy of the Secretary General of the Council of Europe to keep this issue in the focus of the entire organization.
Another important issue is the return of prisoners of war and civilian hostages held by Russia. We insist on the access of international missions to the places of detention, recording the facts of torture and gross violations of the Geneva Conventions.
We will continue to work on post-war recovery – in the areas of judicial reform, electoral processes, and the protection of social rights. We will also work on countering Russian disinformation and monitoring the human rights situation in the occupied territories. Our task is to ensure that all these topics remain not only on the agenda of the Council of Europe, but also bring concrete results for people.
Tetiana Stelmakh
