We spoke with the 25th United States ambassador to the United Nations and the 26th United States national security advisor, John Bolton, about the situation in Ukraine since Trump was elected President. Will the war end in 2025, and what will happen to NATO? Are sanctions working and does the Trump administration have a plan to end the war? Read our interview.
Stanislav Kinka, The Ukrainian Review: Today we wanted to talk about war, about the newly elected President of the United States of America. And let me start with a question: are we any closer to ending the Russian war against Ukraine since Donald Trump was elected President of the United States? We all know about his claim that he can end this war in 24 hours, but this war is not over yet.
John Bolton: Thanks very much for having me. I don’t think we know anymore today about what Trump has in mind as a possible settlement. As you point out, he didn’t succeed in resolving it in the first 24 hours. Now he’s saying between three months and six months, but that’s guesswork [this opinion was expressed by the President of Finland, Alexander Stubb, speaking on January 22, 2025, in Davos – S.K.]. I think that there’s a significant reason, though, for Ukraine to be concerned about the direction that these negotiations could take. And in part, if you look at what Trump said, not only during the campaign but in the transition and in his first 10 days in office, it’s a very strong sense that what he wants is for the war in Ukraine to be behind him.
I’d say the same about the war in the Middle East. He doesn’t want to have to worry about them. He said during the campaign, these were Biden’s wars. He said that had he been president, neither the Ukraine war nor the war in the Middle East would have taken place. And all of that implies that what Trump wants is just to get the wars behind him, which also implies he doesn’t care about the terms on which they’re settled. And that’s why I’m concerned that given Putin’s ability to play with Trump in the first term. He knows from his days in the KGB how to size people up and how to manipulate them. And I’m afraid that once the talks get started, Putin will come off more successfully than President Zelenskyy, who’s done a lot in the past several months to try and warm relations with Trump, but I don’t think has succeeded. Just one small piece of evidence in the past few days, Putin has said publicly that Trump was right, that had he been president, there would not have been a war between Russia and Ukraine. So that’s how you begin to flatter Trump. That’s how you begin to work with him. And I’m afraid, therefore, Putin has already started.
S.K.: Do you believe that Donald Trump and his administration have a plan to stop the war or are they just playing a game to make a deal? He has said many times that he wants to make a deal, but these are not real negotiations. Do you believe that the American side has a real plan to continue to support Ukraine and end this war positively towards Ukraine?
J.B.: I’m afraid that Trump doesn’t have an idea in any strategic sense how he wants the war to end. For him, a deal is a deal. It’s not part of a policy or a grand strategy. It’s just one more transaction. It’s like buying a piece of property in Manhattan and putting a building up on it. You do one, then you move on to the next one. And, in the case of Ukraine, President Zelenskyy has a very clear idea of what he thinks the outcome ought to be for Ukraine. Putin has a very clear idea of what he wants to be the outcome for Russia. And Trump doesn’t have an idea, except if what I said earlier is accurate, he wants the war to be over. One of his advisors, who is now the envoy on resolving the war, Keith Kellogg, and others wrote that the strategy they would employ would be to threaten Russia with more sanctions if they didn’t agree to a deal and threaten Ukraine with a cutoff of assistance if they didn’t negotiate a deal. And I’m worried that with that sort of approach, it could get very difficult for Ukraine fairly quickly. Remember also that during the campaign, the now Vice President JD Vance said he could imagine a settlement where you would freeze the current front lines that would become a new de facto border between Russia and Ukraine. You created the militarized zone there, and Ukraine would agree not to join NATO. And JD Vance said that would be a settlement that he could accept. Very hard to believe that he said that during the campaign without talking to Trump about it. That kind of settlement you could have written in the Kremlin. So, again, these are just bits and pieces. There’s not enough evidence to be conclusive, but it’s evidence why I think there’s good reason in Ukraine to worry.
S.K.: It is very hard to believe that Ukraine accepts the statements made by JD Vance. Nevertheless, the future of the world in the context of Trump’s statement and his first actions is unpredictable. One can recall Greenland in this case. And can one assume that Ukraine will again become a nuclear power if US aid is reduced or stopped altogether?
J.B.: Well, it’s very hard to conclude one or the other, but I think the statements Trump has made about Greenland and Panama not ruling out the use of force are very harmful to Ukraine. They’re very harmful to Taiwan too, because we’ve said repeatedly that in Europe, the use of force was unacceptable post-World War II. And we’ve said to the Chinese, that the use of force against Taiwan is not acceptable. Now, Putin’s already used force twice against Ukraine, and Taiwan remains vulnerable. And yet the statements that Trump has made, you could imagine Xi Jinping or Vladimir Putin making. So that’s why I say, notwithstanding all of President Zelenskyy’s efforts, he has made many, many efforts with Trump, I think that Trump’s desire to see his old friend Vladimir Putin again. His desire to just not have to deal with any of the problems that he sees in effect that Biden created and left for him, probably indicates that it’s going to be very difficult for Ukraine to sustain its position in the negotiations. Of course, a lot depends on the Europeans, and we don’t know how they will behave.
S.K.: Without the United States of America, NATO does not seem like a strong alliance. Let’s consider a possible configuration of international relations based on the new vision of international policy by the Trump administration. What could this lead to? To the strengthening of NATO as a military-political bloc, if European countries spend more on defence, or to the erosion of this organization and, for example, the creation of a new bloc from some European countries? What do you think about the future of NATO in this context?
J.B.: Well, I’m very worried about that, too. I’ve said before, and I still believe that ultimately Trump would like to withdraw the United States from NATO. He does not understand what a collective defence alliance is. In simple terms, he believes the United States protects NATO countries. We don’t get anything out of it in America, and the Europeans don’t pay for it. So what good is the alliance to us? He just doesn’t understand that the US is more secure if its allies in Europe are secure and there’s peace and stability on the continent, which is disrupted when Russia invades a country like Ukraine. Now, people have said, well, this is just a bargaining position. He wanted the Europeans who are members of NATO to adhere to the commitments they made in 2014 to get their defense spending up to 2% of GDP by 2014, by 2024 rather. And some of them have increased their spending, partially because of Trump, partially because of what Russia’s done in Ukraine. That’s what caused that 2% commitment to be made in the first place.
But now Trump says, well, I think NATO members should spend 5% of gross domestic product on the military. My view is that’s what the United States should spend. We’re at about 3% now [in 2024, US defense spending amounted to 3.38% of GDP – S.K.]. But I think in a world of challenges that we face, increased defense spending as in Ronald Reagan’s time is what we need to do. So, if the US went to 5%, hypothetically, it wouldn’t surprise me at all if Trump thought 5% applied to the Europeans. After many of them have strained, like Germany, strained to get to 2%, to be told now you’ve got to do even more than that, shows that Trump is not serious about NATO. He knows it must be hard for people to more than double their defence spending in a short time. However much on the merits, frankly, more Europeans should be spending more just as the U.S has to spend more Trump has created another excuse for America to withdraw from NATO and if at some point uh he decided to go ahead and withdraw he would simply use that as one more reason why NATO had failed.
S.K.: Do you think that the European Union countries do not want to spend even 2% of GDP? It is possible that their cooperation with the United States of America is a more realistic way to ensure greater security because without the USA even 5% of the GDP of small states like the Baltic States does not compare to Russia’s war spending. These are many billions of dollars that Russia receives from European countries because sanctions do not work 100%.
J.B.: I think when Trump talks about NATO members spending at 5%, it may be purely a pretext. It’s one more excuse he can now use to say, that the US spends all this money defending these people, and they won’t spend enough on their behalf. And if the US withdrew from NATO, I mean that’s the end of the alliance as a functional matter. And the Russians know that. I think Putin is going to do everything he can not to get crosswise with Trump on negotiations over Ukraine. And I think he will find other ways to try to make Trump personally happy that they’re talking and meeting again, and encourage Trump in ways that will hurt NATO and certainly on the war in Ukraine.
S.K.: Can you imagine any scenario for the end of this war that would involve NATO troops on Ukrainian soil?
J.B.: Well, as long as Trump is president, I’m very skeptical he would agree to a NATO security guarantee. He would not agree to put American troops on that ceasefire line. I think he’d object to NATO doing it. It would be inconsistent with what he said on so many other things, which is why the critical issue of what security guarantees there would be for Ukraine if a ceasefire were agreed to with Russia is very dangerous. Because without the U.S. involved, I think Ukraine remains very exposed.
S.K.: Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy mentioned that Ukraine would need 200,000 soldiers if the Ukrainian army were to be reduced after the war. What do you think about international peacekeepers on Ukrainian territory? Could these be soldiers from NATO member states, or should this be an international mission under the auspices of the UN?
J.B.: I think Ukraine’s got to be very careful about anything like this in a negotiation the idea that the peacekeepers would only be on the Ukraine side of the line is it would be a huge mistake they should have full access to all the territory that’s part of the state of Ukraine as agreed to in the Biełaviežskaja Pušča agreement when the soviet union broke up because peacekeepers have a way of becoming part of the problem and in the context, that where there’s a division, the division becomes permanent. And I think that would be very unwise for Ukraine to agree to. But it’s also important for people to understand what they mean when they say peacekeepers, and there’s no clarity on that. In most UN peacekeeping forces, the rules of engagement for the peacekeepers are that they are only permitted to use force in their own self-defense. In other words, they’re not there to enforce a ceasefire. They’re there primarily to separate the parties and observe the ceasefire. In that sense, it wouldn’t make any difference whether they were NATO troops or UN peacekeepers; they’re not going to do anything to prevent a further Russian attack. If at some point in five years, Putin will rebuild the Russian army, and he’s ready to launch the invasion for the third time. UN-style peacekeepers would not stop it. And the question for NATO peacekeepers is whether the NATO contributing countries would be willing to have rules of engagement that they would oppose with military force any breach of the ceasefire. That would be a radical step in UN peacekeeping operations. and it’s not something NATO has ever done, to my knowledge. When people talk about NATO peacekeepers, it’s critical to ask, what are their rules of engagement? When are they authorized to use force? Because if they’re going to be as weak as UN peacekeepers are, I’m not sure that Ukraine is any better off with a NATO force than with a UN force. And if the rules of engagement are that the NATO peacekeepers could fight the Russians if they violated the ceasefire, which wouldn’t bother me, but you’d have to ask how many NATO countries would contribute troops under those circumstances.
S.K.: Let me move on to the topic of sanctions. In 2022, there were many voices that sanctions would destroy the Russian economy in one year, in two years, or even in a few months. But from the perspective of 2025, what do you think? Can European and American politicians improve new sanctions to make Russia suffer more? Or do you think that sanctions do not work at all? Because we see that Russia uses a lot of weapons made, including from Western parts and using Western technology. And these supplies from Western countries, unfortunately, are not decreasing.
J.B.: Well, the sanctions are not well enforced. This is a general problem with many economic sanctions. Even the United States doesn’t enforce as effectively as it should the sanctions we impose. And the European Union hardly enforces sanctions at all. The biggest mistake, though, was the kinds of sanctions put on Russian oil sales, because the Biden administration and I think many European countries were worried that if they imposed a strict cutoff of any sales of Russian oil or gas, it would increase the global price. And therefore, in the United States case, increased the price of gasoline at the pump, which Biden didn’t want going into a tough election year. Well, if you want sanctions, you have to be prepared to bear the collateral consequences of sanctions. But the oil sanctions regime in place against Russia now allows them to sell enough on global markets to avoid causing a scarcity that would mean oil prices would rise, but not enough to be able to have a severe economic impact on Russia can still sell oil although below a global market price is still well above its cost of production it’s still earning money that it uses to fight the war so this is an example of trying to do two different things with sanctions and not accomplishing either objective satisfactorily.
S.K.: Let’s get back to the issue of American aid. Can we assume that if American aid to Ukraine is reduced or stopped, it could lead to a situation like Afghanistan in 2021, when American troops just left that country, and a few days later the country was completely under the control of the rebels? Of course, Ukraine and Afghanistan are very different cases. But you understand that America’s image could be damaged in this situation. If Ukraine loses this war to Russia, it will mean that the United States of America and NATO have failed to control this situation in Europe, and this will question their status throughout the world.
J.B.: I agree. I think it’s a big mistake to cut off aid to Ukraine. It was a big mistake to withdraw from Afghanistan. And remember, it wasn’t Biden’s responsibility in a sense. He said he was carrying out the agreement Trump made. He should have rejected the agreement and the withdrawal itself was carried out badly. But it was the same objective that Donald Trump wanted. That’s why he made a deal with the Taliban, which is perfectly predictable. The Taliban didn’t live up to it. But both Trump and Biden wanted out of Afghanistan. And that’s what they did. And I think it had very negative consequences. I don’t think Trump wants to look like he caved into Russia. I don’t think that’s the way this would transpire. But the threat that was part of the article that Keith Kellogg wrote was if Ukraine doesn’t negotiate seriously, then we cut off aid. The other side of it is if Russia didn’t negotiate seriously, the sanctions would be increased, but so would assistance to Ukraine. In Trump’s mind, all these things are fungible. Ukraine, Russia, one side, the other side. He wants a deal. And the terms of the deal, I’m worried, don’t matter to him, which I think could work to Ukraine’s disadvantage. It’s very important to keep talking to members of Congress who support the aid to Ukraine, to engage with Secretary of State [Marco] Rubio, with Michael Waltz, the National Security Advisor, and others to make the case that a Russian victory in Ukraine, which is what a forced settlement would look like, ultimately are very negative for the United States and Donald Trump, certainly, negative for Ukraine. But it’s important to make the case that Trump himself would look bad if he agreed to a settlement that allowed Russia to keep the fruits of its unprovoked aggression.
S.K.: Are there any good signals or voices in support of Ukraine from the Republican party of Congress or the Senate?
J.B.: I think there are many Republicans who strongly support aid to Ukraine. And I think it’s important to stay in touch with them. It should not be a partisan issue, but some Republicans are intimidated by Trump. They’re worried that he would support opponents against them in primary elections, but especially in the Senate. I think the overwhelming majority still strongly supports aid to Ukraine. And in both houses, taking all the membership together, I think there’s strong support for continuing aid to Ukraine. The mission of the Ukrainian embassy here has to be to stay in touch with those people, bring members of Congress to Ukraine, and extend the invitation to both Trump and Vance to come to Ukraine and see things firsthand. I think that’s important. I don’t know whether it will happen, but I think it’s important at a minimum that Secretary of State [Marco] Rubio go there as soon as he can. He’s going to Latin America this weekend [the interview was conducted on January 31, 2025 — ed.]. That’s his first overseas trip. But Ukraine should try and make Ukraine his second destination.
S.K.: The last question is not about analysis, but about your feelings. Do you think this war can end this year, 2025?
J.B.: You can end any war very quickly by agreeing to what your opponent wants. And that would be a huge mistake for Ukraine, even if it comes under enormous pressure. Vladimir Putin and many Russians have made it clear they want the Russian empire back, and that means they want Ukraine back. So an independent Ukraine which Boris Yeltsin agreed to at Biełaviežskaja Pušča is something that Putin and many others want to reverse and if he thinks he can get that he’s prepared to use force again. If Ukraine doesn’t want that as a possible future then it shouldn’t agree to terms that leave it vulnerable. Which I think would mean that it would take a long time to reach an agreement with Russia as long as the Russians want the exact opposite of that.
Interview and text preparation: Stanislav Kinka
